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Sense-Making and Religious Paths: One and the Same?
“Sense-making” is a recognized phenomenon in LIS: one that spawned a body of 
literature with distinct philosophical approaches and methodological strategies. 
“Sense-making” in a broader sense could be defined as one of the goals of 
religious thought and practice. Discuss how the LIS literature in sense-making 
connects, or fails to connect, with sense-making in this broader sense.
INTRODUCTION
Sense-making  was introduced by Brenda Dervin in 1972. It is a metatheory, 1
methodology and method to discovering why people the think the way the do and how 
they make sense of their lives.  Of particular interest to myself and my examiners is the 
comparison of Sense-making to sense making in general as a goal of religious thought 
and practice.
Sense-making is not merely the goal of religious thought and practice (speaking 
to it as some sort of end, as a particular religious sense-made, and in a singular sense 
as one Sense-making event), but can also describe the constant and active enactment 
of sense being made in a religious manner.  Sense-making better encapsulates an 
understanding of religious thought and practice when it is understood as life being lived 
through making sense.  However, religious Sense-making is merely a unique type or 
variety of sense making that human agents may engage with to make sense of their 
world—to bridge existential or ultimate gaps in their lives.  The goal of this paper is to 
 For clarity’s sake, I’ll be using the term “Sense-making” with a capital “S” to refer to the 1
concept as promulgated by Dervin.  If used in the inverse “make-sense,” I’ll place a hyphen in-
between the two words to indicate this special type of making sense to also refer to Dervin’s 
Sense-making.  Otherwise, with the term is referred to generically.
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examine where Sense-making connects or fails to connects to the idea of sense-making 
as a goal of religious thought.  A review of the literature reveals a much more twisted 
path to this understanding, however.
The paper will begin with a brief introduction to Dervin’s Sense-making.  It will 
then discuss what Dervin has called “human mandates”.  Her own theory describes the 
human mandate as “to move through time and space (Dervin, 1983, p. 7)… 
construct[ing] interpretive bridges over a gappy reality” (Dervin, 1999b, p. 730).  To 
connect Sense-making with its definition of being a religious goal, I have drawn upon 
other human mandates from the allied fields of the psychology of religion, transpersonal 
psychology, sociology and information behaviour to highlight a profound similarity 
between the concepts and enactments of Sense-making, meaning-making, information-
seeking, fixing the real, and coping with reality.  After reviewing these mandates, I return 
to Dervin’s Sense-making as a sort of master model for these human mandates to 
discuss what I have termed “the existential gap”.  After defining it, I suggest that what 
makes Sense-making (and its related mandates) similar to the pursuit of a religious goal 
is the bridging of this existential gap.  At this point, I note critiques from Savolainen 
(1999) and Kari (2001) as to the weak-point in Dervin’s metatheory of Sense-making, 
gap-bridging. In order to provide some insight into gap-bridging to bridge the gap 
mentioned by Kari and Savolainen and to provide more depth to Dervin’s definition of 
information as “sense made,” I put forward that what is happening during gap bridging is 
a hermeneutic endeavour and that to make sense is to engage hermeneutically with 
reality.  Related theories of tacit knowledge, embodied familiarization and information 
use with their focus on this hermeneutic enterprise in-the-world, so to speak, refine this 
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this understanding and suggest that what people are looking for when they make-sense 
religiously is not information understood as information-as-knowledge, but rather 
information as an experience.  
Then, I take the Buddhist path as a specific example of how religious thought and 
practice can be viewed as Sense-making, in particular the development of spiritual 
realizations in Buddhism.  The Buddhist path allows for an easy explanation of how 
sense can be made in a religious manner as Buddhist practice is attuned to its own 
sense-making as it were through the application of Buddhist philosophy or doctrine.  
This application may be more difficult with another religious tradition.  However, the 
Buddhist problem of ‘ignorance’ presents a difficulty to the ethos of Sense-making (the 
ethos being, as I have described it, “any sense makes sense as long as it makes-
sense”).  Largely, humans’ sense-making goes unexamined, but in Buddhism, a 
human’s habitual sense-making is challenged as it leads to suffering and misery.  
However, this challenge with the ethos of Sense-making can still be understood within 
the boundaries of Sense-making by understanding the influence of religious cognitive 
authorities and communities of practice upon an individual’s Sense-making.
Finally, I will discuss briefly how religious information seeking behaviours 
challenges conceptions of every-day life information behaviours.  Are they perhaps, as 
Clemens & Cushing (2010) have suggested, beyond every day life? Or rather does their 
simultaneous “situated and transsituated”-ness (Dervin, 1999b, p. 733) force scholars to 
consider them in the middle ground?
WHAT IS SENSE-MAKING?
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As mentioned in the introduction, Sense-making was introduced in 1972 by 
Dervin and her colleagues, but did not gain the name “Sense-making” until 1983 
(Dervin, 1999b).  The basic goal of Sense-making is to understand how individuals 
negotiate living in an unpredictable world.  The primary metaphor of Sense-making is 
the Sense-making Triangle which outlines the three essential components of Sense-
making: Situation-Gap-Use.  An individual, enacting the human mandate to “to move 
through time and space” (Dervin, 1983, p. 7), and that can be situated within a unique 
context and time and place, encounters a gap and is forced to stop their movement 
forward as per the mandate.  Examples of gaps include: a misunderstanding, a negative 
emotion or feeling or a lack of knowledge.  It is anytime when the sense that that 
individual was operating in fails to provide a satisfactory accounting for new experiences 
and thus the “individual’s internal sense has ‘run out’” (Dervin & Nilan, 1986, p. 21).  
Thus, to satisfactorily create new sense, the gap must be bridged.
The bridging of the gap is where Dervin’s focus on “verbings” enters.  The focus 
of the bridging of the gap is on the hows of people’s sense makings rather than the 
whats of people’s sense making.  As such, scholars have listed a multiplicity of ways 
that human beings bridge the gaps.  These verbings include for instance: got 
information, got help, got directions, went down a new path, decided to start over, or 
“observings, thinkings, idea creatings, comparings, contrastings, rejectings, talkings, 
sendings, agreeings, disagreeings” (Dervin, 1991, p. 64).  Once the gap has been 
bridged, sense has been remade and the individual continues to move through time and 
space until sense is unmade again, using the sense that has been made.  Although 
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sometimes, making-sense leads to further sense-making or perhaps even sense-
unmaking.
Within LIS, Sense-making has been used extensively.  Dervin reports in 1999 
that over one hundred scholars are using Sense-making as a metatheory, methodology 
or method (Dervin, 2003/1999).  Fifteen years later, the number of examples and 
applications is sure to have increased.  At the intersection between information and 
religion, Sense-making has been used by Roland (2007; 2008) to study the Sense-
making of a clergy member as he prepares and writes a sermon and as well by Coco 
(1999) who examined conflicts between Catholics’ sense-making and the orthodox 
teachings of the Church.  Some further studies by other others that employ Sense-
making in a religious context are summarized briefly in Dervin et al. (2011).
HUMAN MANDATES
Dervin fails to define what exactly she means by mandate, but from what I 
understand of her theory, I believe it is safe to imply that it refers to the ‘essential activity 
of living human beings.’  Curiously, Dervin’s choice of the use of the word ‘mandate’ 
itself, rather than a less ‘powerful’ word, signals a subtle undertone in reference to a 
divine, spiritual, or otherworldly authority issuing the mandate.  In her writings, Dervin 
describes three human mandates: (1) “to move through time-space” (Dervin, 1983, p. 
7); (2) “to make sense without complete instruction in a reality, which is itself in flux and 
requires continued sense-making” (Dervin, 1999a, p. 332); and (3) “to reach out to the 
sense made by others, in order to understand what insights it may provide into our 
continuing human dilemma” (Dervin, 1999a, p. 332).  Despite Dervin’s lack of 
methodological clarity here, I believe that these three mandates can be condensed into 
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one that closely resembles the second mandate since the command to make sense 
involves movement through time and space, otherwise there would be no sense to 
make (things would be static) and attempting to discover the Sense-makings of others is 
really for the purpose of ameliorating an individual’s own Sense-making.
In order to link Dervin’s Sense-making with the pursuit of religious goals, I have 
borrowed from the psychology of religion, transpersonal psychology, sociology and 
information behaviour to highlight a profound similarity between the concepts of, and 
enactments of, Sense-making, meaning-making, information-seeking, fixing the real, 
and coping with reality in that they align with the intention in Dervin’s human mandate.  
In other words, I treat these concepts synonymously.
I will briefly illustrate their close alignment with each other.  Common to all of 
them is the fact that they are all understood (or can be understood) from a whole-life 
perspective.  In regards to Sense-making, Weick’s (2006) description of sense making 
as “order, interruption, recovery” (p. 1731) harkens to Dervin’s Sense-making Triangle of 
situation, gap, and use.  Descriptions of human mandates using Meaning-making 
closely approximates Sense-making’s mandate.  Oman (2013) writes “Scholars have 
offered evidence that religious beliefs, emotions, practices, and experiences may 
provide meaning and facilitate dealing with fundamental existential issues such as 
death, suffering, and injustice” (p. 36).  Oman’s statement captures the impermanence 
of life which is similar to Dervin’s idea of flux.  Park (2013) supplies: “People require a 
system of meaning to comprehend the world and to navigate and organize the infinite 
stimuli the encounter, from basic perceptions of their environment to broad existential 
questions” (p. 357) which captures Dervin’s sense of a lack of complete instruction into 
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reality.  Allport’s (1950) statement, “To many men [sic], religion is primarily a search for 
complete knowledge, for unfissioned truth” (p. 18) also relates to a search for a set of 
complete instructions to reality, linking information-seeking to the rest as a human 
mandate.  Case (2012) cites Donohew, Tipton & Haney (1978, p. 31) and presents a 
similar sentiment:  “Information-seeking must be one of our most fundamental methods 
for coping with our environment” (p. 19).
The notion of “fixing reality” speaks to proverbially ‘pinning it down in one place’ 
so that it can be better understood, or in other words, so that sense can be made of it or 
meaning properly derived from it.  In regards to fixing reality, Nelson (2000) writes: “I 
would assert that behind the activity of most of our lives there lies a profound spiritual 
impulse—a passion to know the ontological bottom line and align ourselves with it” (p. 
79).  Dervin (1999b) hints at another (unofficial) human mandate when she writes 
“Sense-Making assumes that the quest of human beings to fix the real faces a never-
ending riddle” (p. 730) which echoes Nelson’s statement.  Finally, Sense-making, 
meaning-making, information-seeking and fixing reality can all be described as a way to 
cope with our reality which often pits us against the likes of the sufferings of birth, old 
age, death, parting from things we do not want to be parted from and not being parted 
from things that we do want to be parted from.  The pioneering psychologist of religion, 
William James (1958/1902) thoughtfully supplies, “If we were to ask the question: ‘What 
is human life’s chief concern?’ one of the answers we should receive would be: ‘It is 
happiness.’  How to gain, how to keep, how to recover happiness, is in fact for most 
men [sic] at all times the secret motive of all they do, and of all they are willing to 
endure” (p. 76), which speaks to our profound motive to avoid suffering and seek 
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happiness that is the essence of coping with reality.  Finally, Baker (2004) offers some 
findings on a study of information needs at the end of life.  She reports that information 
“help[s] them [the dying] cope with a phase of life that is fully of mystery and 
uncertainty” (p. 82) which speaks to the synonymity of information-seeking and coping 
with reality.
THE EXISTENTIAL GAP
Now that it has been demonstrated that these different human mandates are 
roughly espousing the same concept, I return to Dervin’s Sense-making as a sort of 
master model that stands in for the aggregate of these human mandates as Dervin’s 
model is the most theoretically developed and extensive of these models (with the 
exception of perhaps Park’s [2010] model of meaning-making).
Human mandates urge individuals to make sense of their reality, something 
which is a “‘constant’ of the human condition” (Dervin, 1991, p. 64).  But, to make sense, 
a gap is required over which to make sense.  Old sense needs to have run out first; 
there needs to be “a missing piece in a picture of a situation” (Dervin, 1980, p. 44).  
While some gaps lead to discrete information seeking tasks such as finding out the 
location of a retail store or searching a government’s website to find out tax information,  
a gap may also be an opportunity for us to learn to behave in a different manner or feel 
differently about a particular issue speaking to the gap indicating a need for a feeling or 
sensation rather than just for information.  However in terms of understanding the goal 
of religious thought and practice as sense making, I suggest that human beings are 
constantly faced with larger and more profound gaps than those aforementioned and 
that our making sense or making meaning of reality also involves the negotiation over 
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existential gaps that must be bridged from the moment that human beings are born.  
These gaps are the largest in a human beings life, perhaps taking a whole life time to 
bridge.  
These gaps are characterized by a human being’s confrontation with his or her 
most profound existential issues: the purpose and meaning of life, death and afterlife, 
metaphysical questions, the problem of good and evil, and notions of identity.  For 
example, “Who am I?” and “What is the meaning of my life” are information-seeking or 
meaning-making questions that derive from these existential gaps.  James (1958/1902) 
provides notable examples: 
The fact that we can die, that we can be ill at all, is what perplexes us; the fact 
that we now for a moment live and are well is irrelevant to that perplexity.  We 
need a life not correlated with death, a health not liable to illness, a kind of good 
that will not perish, a good in fact that flies beyond the Goods of nature. (p. 121)
 
Like any other information need, these existential gaps may manifest, depending on the 
severity of the gap, as a feeling uncertainty, or anxiety or as some sort of viscerogenic 
need (Taylor, 1962).  The experience of Weick’s (1993) cosmology episode, “when 
people suddenly and deeply feel that the universe is no longer a rational, orderly 
system,” as “I've never been here before, I have no idea where I am, and I have no idea 
who can help me” (p. 634) may illustrate this feeling.  However, the benefit of these 
negative feelings, says Kuhlthau (2004) is that “Uncertainty due to a lack of 
understanding, a gap in meaning, or a limited construction initiates the process of 
information seeking (p. 92), allowing the individual to bridge the gap.  Dervin 
(2003/1999) defines ‘information’ as “sense made” (p.150), so in order to complete the 
information-seeking task and reduce anxiety, sense has to be made in some manner, 
perhaps by ignoring the gap, but perhaps by turning to religion as a way to help make 
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sense of these existential concerns.  The necessity of bridging these existential gaps is 
highlighted by Allport (1950) who writes, “Some therapists today incline to see in almost 
every neurosis an unsolved metaphysical issue” (p. 79) indicating that an inability to 
make sense of these gaps leads to a lack of well-being and that using the verbing 
“ignoring” as gap bridging may be detrimental in the long run.  But here in lies the rub;  
Godbold (2006) notes that
Individuals may not search for information if they perceive that the gap is too 
big….Other situations in which the gap will appear to big are when the person 
feels they do not have time or cannot see how to proceed. They may not be able 
to see how to search usefully, they may not understand the problem enough or 
they may be unable to imagine the possibility of a solution. (p. 6)
This is very likely true for many individuals who have no idea where to look for help with 
their existential concerns.  Godbold’s further comments suggest that these existential 
concerns are too great for individuals to ever bridge in one life time, and yet humans will 
continue to do so because they are driven by their mandates.  Godbold writes again,
Having first read Dervin's ideas some months after the unexpected death of my 
mother, I was immediately struck by the problem of an individual having a gap 
with no means to span it. Furthermore, that gap of mine remains: I still feel a 
need for information about death in general and about my mother's death in 
particular, information that I believe I will never obtain. It is plain that in some 
sense, some gaps may never go away. Yet life goes on and I am not still 
shivering by the gap. Instead, there seems to be a human ability to juggle many 
gaps simultaneously. Some problems may be left to one side for a time while the 
individual focuses on other issues.” (p. 7-8)
To this, Savolainen (2006) concurs in that bridges may be constructed in phases and 
only partially crossed (p. 1121). 
To further demonstrate that this existential gap is not merely a theoretical 
construct and to conclude this section, I have borrowed research from the fields of the 
psychology of religion and information behaviour to provide evidence to their existence.  
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More research is needed to give further conceptual clarity to this phenomena, but for 
the time being, I direct the readers attention to the following examples.  To begin, 
Clemens & Cushing’s (2010) respondents in their study of individuals conceived via 
artificial insemination searching for their fathers remarked: “‘I’m not just searching for 
answers in my career or my love life, but now I’m searching for answers in my own 
identity’” to which Clemens & Cushing suggest “[the informant’s] comment implies that 
the search for her donor is unlike a more common search for information about career 
or love life, information for which the general population might search” (p. 9).  Another 
example is provided by Ulland & DeMarinis (2014) who, in their study of the way 
adolescents cope with existential information, have defined the term as “includ[ing] both 
the searching and longing for meaning and significance in life – and the interpretations 
and answers given in religious, spiritual and other types of worldview expressions. This 
search penetrates to the core of the personal level and is nested within and interacts 
with the societal and cultural levels” (p. 586).  While these scholars do not explicitly 
write about an existential gap, its existence can be inferred from the atypical concerns 
expressed above as compared to other everyday life information seeking tasks.  
Kirkpatrick (2013) explains that “Psychologists of religion have long sought to explain 
the pervasiveness of religion in terms of religious motivation: that is, the idea that 
religion somehow satisfies one or more ‘fundamental’ or ‘basic’ human needs or motives 
[such as a] resolution of existential concerns” (p. 130). Lastly, Baker (2004), when 
writing about information needs at the end of life, has termed “the meaning of eternity,” 
“the ability to reflect on life and to gain a sense of inner peace,” and “whether there is 
life after death” (p. 81) as spiritual information needs, also suggesting that perhaps 
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these stem from a similar place as a normal information need such as a gap but are 
profoundly existential in concern. 
CRITICISMS OF GAP BRIDGING AND INFORMATION AS EXPERIENCE
Dervin’s Sense-making model posits that the Sense-making gap is crossed by 
bridging it.  Bridges include “ideas, cognitions, thoughts, attitudes, beliefs, values, 
feelings, emotions, intuitions, memories, stories, [and] narratives” (Savolainen, 2006, p. 
1122) that allow an individual to reconstruct sense of their reality.  Bridges can be 
crossed in religious ways.  For example, Jennings (1982) writes, “Ritual action is a 
means by which its participants discover who they are in the world and ‘how it is’ with 
the world” (p. 113) suggesting an existential gap related to an individual’s identity and 
purpose in the world is bridged and Michels (2011) describes how “prayer was used as 
a tool to understand information” (p. 3), or in other words, as a way to bridge the gap in 
religious understanding.
  However, these bridgings seem to only allow a metaphorical understanding of 
how the bridge is actually crossed in the mind of the sense maker.  Savolainen (1999) 
notes Dervin is “strangely vague about gap-bridging” (cited in Kari, 2001, p. 39) while 
Kari (2001) furthers:
[Gap-bridging] has by no means been elaborated to the same extent as the other 
phases.  It is ironic that Sense-Making is concerned with almost everything that 
leads up to and succeeds sense-making, but says practically nothing about what 
and how meanings are actually made by the actor.  The approach skates over 
the intriguing outlooks of experiencing the mental processing of senses and its 
potential genre-bound character. (p. 203)
Ultimately, these scholars are asking, “how is sense actually made in Sense-making?”  
Perhaps this lack of understanding derives from a lack of understanding about the 
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human mind, and perhaps this suggests a need to examine the mind more closely in the 
field of Library and Information Science (please see my response to Question 2).  But 
for the time being, hermeneutics, the study of how people interpret, provides the best 
answer to this question.  Despite the above criticisms, Dervin (1999b) knows full well 
that Sense-making is an hermeneutical endeavour.  She says “humans construct 
interpretive bridges over a gappy reality (p. 730, emphasis mine).  However, scholars 
could benefit from an explanation from Dervin herself as to how hermeneutics fits 
exactly into the Sense-making paradigm.  
Budd (2001) supplies that “Hermeneutics is a way to approach the life-world and 
being-in-the-world” (p. 277).  Hermeneutics is the essence of what allows the Sense-
making individual to continue forward with their human mandate to move through time 
and space.  Kuhlthau (2004) writes that “interpretive task is central to the constructive 
process” (p. 22) suggesting that out of misunderstanding—the gap—involves a process 
of creating a new way of being-in-the-world .  Religion is in essence a pre-conceived 2
hermeneutic, however at this level, it becomes the job of the individual to move beyond 
the manifest content of the religious tradition (i.e., holy texts, oral teachings) through a 
further hermeneutic endeavour to the definitive meaning (Palmer, 1969 in Budd, 1995, 
p. 307).  This allows an individual to reconstruct their sense according to the definitive 
meaning.
 This understanding or conceptualization is borrowed from Heidegger, and I only understand it 2
really in a cursorily manner as I have yet to read his works in any great depth so please forgive 
me if I have misunderstood some aspect of this concept.  As far as I can interpret “being-in-the-
world” describes a phenomenological ontology and suggests that it is impossible to understand 
our reality from a place other than our existence as it appears to us.
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An instance or series of achieved hermeneutical understanding could potentially 
become tacit knowledge.  Tacit knowledge is understood by Polanyi (1958) as a faculty 
that “underl[lies] our ability to perform tasks we find difficult to explain” (cited in 
Zappavigna-Lee & Patrick, 2008, p. 3657) and that since “explicit knowledge must rely 
on being tacitly understood and applied…all knowledge is either tacit or rooted in tacit 
knowledge (Polanyi, 1969, p. 144 cited in Zappavigna-Lee & Patrick, 2008, p. 3657).  
Thus, sense in Sense-making could also be understood as a step in the process 
towards the hermeneutical understanding leading to action.  A similar approach is 
explained by Yanchar, Spackman, & Faulconer who relate the notion of “antecedent 
familiarity.”  They (2013) supply that it is “a type of proto-understanding…antecedent 
familiarity constitutes a basis for the negotiation of novel situations en route to further 
familiarity and concernful involvement” (p. 223); it is the faculty which allows things to 
become familiar to our minds.  With familiarity, humans can more easily be engaged in 
actions that derive from their new understanding.
Savolainen's (2009) theory of ‘information use’ also connects hermeneutics with 
action.  He defines information use to “denote the ways in which interpretations 
(knowledge) thus formed are employed in problem solving” (p. 2).  However, he 
conceives of the hermeneutic event happening at the same time, or within the same 
context of human action and that the two cannot be separated.  This is aligned with 
Dervin’s Sense-making theory as she also posits that an individual’s Sense-making 
cannot be separated from the situation and context that the Sense-maker finds him or 
herself.  Savolainen (2009) writes: 
This epistemology suggests that human action itself does epistemic work and 
that human action is a part practice as well as what is possessed in the head. 
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Epistemic work is generally defined as “work people must do to acquire, confirm, 
deploy, or modify what needs to be known in order for them to do what they 
do” (Cook and Brown 1999: 399). (p. 6)
Action in particular is important to the above theories because being-in-the-world 
necessarily involves intentioned action, even if these actions are considered mental.  
Intention implies that the reason why individuals are engaging with religion through an 
hermeneutical endeavour is so that they can continue to pursue the human mandate 
and move through time and space.  When an individual searches for religious 
information to bridge their existential gap, he or she may understand that a mere 
intellectual understanding will not suffice to lead him or her to relieve their existential 
issue; the definitive or hidden understanding must be grasped and that only (potentially) 
occurs through the processes of tacitization, familiarity or use mentioned above.  In 
other words, a hermeneutic understanding must be co-existent with action, it must be 
“in-the-world,” a part of experience for it to induce its transformative effect.  Only when a 
hermeneutical endeavour is tied with action as it is described in the theories above, can 
it be considered “real” information that is derived from an existentially-concerned 
information-seeking process, as per Dervin’s definition because sense has been made.  
An intellectual understanding may be considered a sort of aborted or failed information-
seeking event.  As such, it could be said that individuals are searching for information as 
experience rather than information as knowledge.
THE BUDDHIST PATH AS SENSE-MAKING
Buddhists believe that the reason why human beings suffer is because they are 
ultimately ignorant  about the way reality exists; otherwise stated, they are unaware of 3
 The use of the word ‘ignorant’ is meant to be terminological rather than being insulting.3
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the true relationship between their mind and reality.  Suffering occurs because reality 
exists in one way while ignorant beings live and govern their according to the way it 
appears in another.  Ultimately, a dissonance occurs between the two.  Jinpa (2000) 
explains: 
This ‘ignorance,’ or avidya as it is called in the Buddhist parlance, is not a mere 
passive state of unknowing, nor is it a state of universal doubt along the lines of 
Cartesian universal scepticism.  Avidya is directly related to one’s own sense of 
self and identity.  It is an attachment to a false notion of self. (p. 11)
In terms of Sense-making, it can be said that an ignorant being’s Sense-making is 
‘wrong’.  He or she is perceiving gaps in reality when there are none, especially in 
regards to the Sense-making surrounding the nature of his or her own self, mind and 
existence as Jinpa notes.  Namely, ignorant beings conceive this self as permanent, to 
exist independently of both the mind and body, to be the most important ‘self’ in all of 
existence.
In order to ‘correct’ the Sense-making so that the dissonance between the way 
things exist and the way things are thought of too exist ceases, the Buddhist individual 
would engage in applying the teachings of the Buddha, called the Dharma, to one’s life.  
Essentially, the Dharma can be understood as a Buddhist hermeneutic. The Buddhist 
tries to replace his own ignorant Sense-making with the Sense-making of Buddha, 
which does not experience any suffering because he has ceased making-sense in 
regards to an ignorant conception of self and reality.  This application of the Buddhist 
hermeneutic is accomplished through meditation and the development of concentration.  
With the development of concentration, the individual is able to see more and more 
clearly the subtler incorrect forms of Sense-making and is able to apply a Buddhist 
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understanding in its place.  Pagis (2010) notes the importance of this to the whole 
endeavour: “The observation of the present moment brings out the subtleties of 
experience that are commonly ignored in everyday life” (p. 480).  On the subtlest level, 
the application of the Buddhist hermeneutic occurs by essentially forcing a Sense-
making gap in the ignorant interpretation of reality, recognizing that it is the Sense-
making itself that is causing the problem.  The individual then bridges the gap through 
the application and re-application of the Buddhist hermeneutic, holding single-pointedly 
the special conclusions used to change the mind (e.g. that all phenomena are 
impermanent, compassion for the suffering of other living beings, that all phenomena 
lack inherent existence).  This process in meditation is aided through the application of 
mindfulness outside of meditation sessions to the ignorant Sense-making that takes 
place and through the re-application of the Buddhist hermeneutic.  Over time, and 
through the processes of familiarization and tacitization, the ingrained Dharma becomes 
tacit understanding “…a form of functioning by which an insight or learning has been 
integrated into a person’s everyday thoughts, feelings and actions” (Todres, 2000, p. 
182) and the individual is said to have achieved a realization.  That is, the 
understanding has become a permanent part of the individual’s Sense-making; effort is 
no longer needed to generate the insight, but arises naturally and effortlessly as the 
ignorant Sense-making did at one time.
The Buddhist path allows for an easy explanation of how sense can be made in a 
religious manner as Buddhist practice is attuned to its own Sense-making, as it were, 
through its focus on understanding the mind, its nature and functions. This application 
may be more difficult with another religious tradition.  In the future, it may be beneficial 
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to engage in a thought experiment down this avenue and to compare these outcomes.  
It may reveal that only some religious traditions can be easily compared with Sense-
making.
VIOLATION OF THE ETHOS OF SENSE-MAKING?
Near the end of his dissertation, Kari (2001) wonders if objectivity is sought in 
regards to a Sense-making claim, or if any other evidence or sources put forth to refute 
it, does this violate the “ethos of Sense-making” by not allowing an individual to make 
sense as they naturally do (p. 206)?  The Buddhist problem of ‘ignorance,’  I believe,  
presents a difficulty to the ethos of Sense-making (as I have described it: “any sense 
makes sense as long as it makes-sense”) because it also asserts that ‘unenlightened’ 
Sense-making is flawed in that leads to suffering.  Dervin was more interested in the 
hows of Sense-making rather than the whats, she wanted to study how Sense-making 
happens across all human beings rather than debate about whether one instance of 
Sense-making is wrong or not or is superior to another.  It is here where perhaps 
Sense-making does not connect to, or at least has some difficulties connecting to being 
the goal of religious thought and practice.
However, it is possible to frame an individual’s decision to adopt a religious 
Sense-making strategy over their own “natural” Sense-making within a Sense-making 
strategy.  In this context, the religious Sense-making can be viewed as a better gap-
bridger than the natural Sense-making because the individual has made a decision to 
change his or her Sense-making.  Furthermore, one is also able to understand the 
challenge of one way of Sense-making against another within the boundaries of Sense-
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making by understanding the influence of cognitive authorities and communities of 
practice upon an individual’s Sense-making.  Foreman-Wernet (2003) describes 
Dervin’s Sense-making as a methodology that  “also assumes that issues of force and 
power pervade the human condition and, thus, pays specific attention to forces that 
assists or facilitate movement in time space (e.g. freedom and creativity) as well as 
those that constrain or hinder it (e.g. structure and habit)…human beings are seen as 
being both affected by structural power and are themselves sites of power” (p. 8).  
In regards to the effects of cognitive authority, Wilson (1983) points out that “If we 
had to depend entirely on ideas that we ourselves invented, we would make little sense 
of the world.  We mostly depend on others for ideas, as well as for information about 
things outside the range of direct experience…Much of what we think about the world is 
what we have second hand from others” (p. 10).  This quote aptly describes the 
Buddhist thinking in regards to cognitive authorities such as the Buddha himself, gurus, 
teachers, as well senior students.  Buddhist practitioners rely upon those more 
experienced in applying Buddhist Sense-making to their lives to be able to more 
effectively apply it to their own.  This reliance is fundamental to the Buddhist path.  
Together the cognitive authorities that are relied upon are called the “Sangha” and it is 
one of the “Three Jewels” of Buddhism along with the Buddha Jewel and Dharma 
Jewel. By relying upon the Three Jewels, one is lead to Enlightenment, the 
soteriological goal of Buddhist practice.  The practitioner accepts the constraints and 
forces upon his or her Sense-making as he or she believes it will be beneficial. 
The Sangha can also be considered a community which imposes similar forces 
and constraints upon an individual.  Indeed, Chatman (1999) describes community and 
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imbues it with this sort of power: “Community in its most intrinsic sense is the most 
existential definition of who one is. Ultimately this means that the ‘stuff’ of one’s world is 
made from such things as social heritage, language, and the myriad of social norms that 
govern collective behavior. Community, then, explains the totality of my world” (p. 211).
The community then is able to shape the Sense-making of the individual through the 
imposition of these collective ways of acting.  Again, the practitioner would consider 
these beneficial because he or she wants to abandon the senses of community, and by 
association, the sense of self that is the source of the problem of ignorant beings.  
Davies (2006) furthers the power of community by noting that this is the primary way in 
which members of the community learn (i.e, influence the minds of individuals and 
change their Sense-making), by “becoming a full participant in a sociocultural 
practice” (p. 104).
ELIS OR BEYOND ELIS?
Davenport (2010) lists Dervin’s Sense-making as one of the popular everyday life 
information seeking (ELIS) methods.  ELIS is primarily concerned with the information 
behaviours of individuals outside of work and scholarship contexts as often these 
behaviours may be imposed on individuals.  It can be generally typified as concerning 
information behaviours associated with “the familiarity of activities and affairs, repetition, 
routine” (Kari & Hartel, 2007) of daily life.  However, Clemens & Cushing (2010) 
challenge the notion of ELIS by presenting examples, such as the search for sperm 
donors by children of these donors and the search for information about birthmothers by 
adoptees, that may be normally considered ELIS due to its non-work nature and 
routineness but are rather something else.  They believe that they are characterized 
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rather as “deeply meaningful and intensely personal with life-long impacts” (Clemens & 
Cushing, 2010, p. 1) and are thus not ELIS.  They conclude their paper by suggesting 
that “information seeking behavior within some contexts should be explored as a third 
facet of life experience: the deeply meaningful and profoundly personal” (p. 1) indicating 
perhaps a third area of information behaviour research outside of work behaviours and 
ELIS.
However, religious behaviour could easily be considered ‘every-day life’ 
behaviour.  Some people engage in religious practices daily or perhaps attend a service 
regularly.  Yet when religious behaviour and Sense-making are compared and 
contrasted as they were in this paper, the “beyond” everyday life character of these is 
revealed since individuals are attempting in some instances to move beyond this worldly 
life.  Are religious information behaviours simultaneously “situated and 
transsituated” (Dervin, 1999b, p. 733) as Dervin’s Sense-making individual might be?  
Or are religious pursuits better understood within a framework of ELIS, what Savolainen 
(1995) calls “mastery of life,” where a meaningful order or coherence is maintained in 
life (p. 264)?  Does the Buddha’s middle way approach perhaps offer a solution, or is 
best to always consider them inhabiting this middle ground?
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this paper made an effort to discuss in which ways Dervin’s Sense-
making and sense being made as a goal of religious thought and practice connected or 
failed to connect.  These two concepts are connected by their practical synonymity with 
each other along with related concepts such as meaning-making and coping with reality, 
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amongst others.  Since they were deemed so similar, they were discussed together 
using Dervin’s Sense-making as a master model for them all.  While following human 
mandates, the existential gap was put forward as a reason for ultimate information-
seeking, a way to relieve existential angst and pursue religious behaivours.  This was 
followed by a discussion of some criticisms of Dervin’s gap-bridging and a suggestion 
that the essence of Dervin’s Sense-making and sense making as a religious goal hinge 
upon hermeneutics.  The Buddhist path was then taken as a specific example of these 
postulations in action, but the path also presented a potential violation of the ethos of 
Sense-making.  This violation could be resolved however by understanding religious 
Sense-making through the lens of Sense-making, by understanding how cognitive 
authorities and community influence a Buddhist practitioner’s Sense-making.
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